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Abstract
Existing research on terrorism as a strategy has largely neglected the apparent differ-
ences in what groups target. Whereas some organizations primarily target undefended
civilians, other attack mainly official and hard targets. I develop an explanation of ter-
rorist groups’ relative target preferences based on how a group’s ties to its constituency
and specific government repressive strategies either constrain or incentivize terrorist
attacks against soft civilian vs. hard/official targets. Specific sources of support and
the degree of out-group antagonism in their constituency shape terrorist groups’ pri-
mary targeting strategy. While groups with transnational support are generally more
likely to target primarily undefended civilians, not all groups with local support are re-
strained. Groups with low out-group antagonism and local civilian support incur high
political costs for targeting civilians and focus primarily on official targets. Instead,
groups with domestic support but high out-group antagonism have mixed incentives.
When facing indiscriminate government repression these groups become more likely to
target primarily undefended civilians, because they can justify such a response to their
audience, direct attacks against out-group civilians, and radicalize local constituents.
Indiscriminate repression, however, does not change the targeting strategy of groups
who face high political costs for attacking civilians. I examine the observable impli-
cations of the theory in a comparative analysis of terrorist organizations (1995-2007)
as well as an over-time analysis of repression and targeting in the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict (1987-2004), and find strong support for the theoretical argument.
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Introduction
Whom do terrorists target? Popular accounts of terrorism portray such violence as indis-
criminate almost by definition. In practice, there is great variation in the targeting decisions
of groups that resort to terrorism. In the Philippines, between 1990 and 2007, the New
People’s Army carried out thousands of terrorist attacks; however, 73% of those attacks
targeted government officials, police, and property, and only a minority targeted undefended
civilians.1 In contrast, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, military wing of Fatah, primarily
attacked soft civilian targets (over 70% of attacks), and did so consistently for nearly ten
years. The NPA and Al-Aqsa have secular ideologies, enjoy local support and territorial
control, have a strong leadership, do not have powerful state sponsors or access to natural
resources (Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan 2009). Existing studies would therefore con-
clude that these organizations should both limit terrorist violence against civilians (e.g. Asal
et al. 2009; Salehyan, Siroky & Wood 2014; Weinstein 2007); but that is not the case. In
absolute levels, both organizations carried out a large number of attacks against civilians.
At the same time, Al-Aqsa almost exclusively attacked soft civilian targets whereas the NPA
primarily focused on official targets.
These patterns are not unique. In the Syrian conflict, between 2012 and 2015, all the main
insurgent groups carried out terror attacks. However, the targeting strategies employed var-
ied widely, with the Islamic State (IS) being the most indiscriminate (over 75% of attacks
against undefended civilians) while the Syrian Islamist Jabhat Fateh al-Sham targeted un-
defended civilians about 40% of the times and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) exhibited the
greatest level of restraint, mainly attacking government targets (81%).
1I use the term undefended civilians and soft civilian targets interchangeably to indicate
civilian targets that do not benefit from armed protection and are not associated with the
government. Unless specified otherwise, the source for all percentages is the Global Terrorism
Database.
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What explains these differences in terrorist targeting strategies? And when are undefended
civilians more likely to be targeted in terror attacks? The primary purpose of this article is
to answer these related questions from an actor-level perspective.
Extant terrorism research has mainly focused on structural causes and determinants of
attack frequency and lethality. While providing substantial insights, this approach cannot
explain who is targeted in terrorist attacks and why. These are important questions because
they tell us when specific targets are most at risk, and thus improve counterterrorism efforts,
as well as mitigate the human costs of terrorism.2 Of course, conflict scholarship has analyzed
attacks against civilians, but it has typically looked at civilian targets in isolation, without
considering the choice of such targets in the context of other available options (e.g., public
officials, police, and low-casualty targets such as property).3 This exclusive focus on soft
civilian targets has several shortcomings. First, it has little to say about more discriminate
terrorist strategies such as those of the NPA or FSA, and whether different targets are
substitutes or complements. Second, it cannot distinguish between a high level of terrorist
violence overall (e.g. NPA) and violence targeting undefended civilians specifically (e.g. Al-
Aqsa and IS). In general, in the existing studies, attacks against undefended civilians are
rarely viewed as a cost-effective strategy; rather, the attacks are seen from the perspectives of
ideological commitments (religion, in particular), principal-agent problems, military control,
and the absence of feasible alternatives for weak groups (e.g. Abrahms & Potter, 2015; Asal,
Brown & Schulzke, 2015; Drake, 1998; Kalyvas, 2006; Polo & Gleditsch, 2016; Weinstein,
2007).4
2Brandt & Sandler (2010), and Santifort, Sandler & Brandt (2013) analyze targeting
patterns from a global perspective, but not the determinants of targeting strategies at the
organizational level.
3See e.g. Asal et al. (2009); Salehyan, Siroky & Wood (2014); Stanton (2013); Wood
(2010).
4Among the notable exceptions, see Stanton (2013).
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This study takes a different approach by focusing on civilian targets as an endogenous
choice of terrorism. It argues that the choice between undefended civilians and official
targets reflects how terrorists strike the balance between inflicting harm on the opponent
and mobilizing support for their cause. Terrorist attacks against undefended civilians require
fewer resources, are highly newsworthy, and can effectively undermine government control; at
the same time they can be much more costly than attacks on official targets in terms of loss of
popular support and legitimacy (Kalyvas, 2006; Abrahms, 2013). However, I argue that these
political costs are not uniform, and vary significantly across militant organizations. Whether
attacking civilians is politically costly (or beneficial) relative to official targets depends on
three key factors: the level of local support a group enjoys; the existence of a strong in-
group out-group cleavage which defines membership in terrorists’ local constituency; and
government repressive strategies.
The combination between terrorists’ reliance on external vs. local support and the degree
of antagonism between terrorists’ local constituency and the general population (i.e. the
out-group) determine an organization’s initial preference for undefended civilians or official
and low-casualty targets. Some groups have very weak ties with local civilians because they
mainly rely on external sources of support. These groups are relatively unconstrained by the
risk of losing popular support and generally prefer to invest their resources in attacking soft
civilian targets. Groups that depend on local support and have low out-group antagonism
are instead exposed to a high risk of popular backslash. These groups favor restraint and
choose to impose costs and attract support through attacks on official and low-casualty
targets. Groups with local support but high out-group antagonism are placed in-between
and face competing incentives. Government indiscriminate repression dynamically influences
these groups’ targeting strategies by mitigating their preexisting constraints for targeting
civilians. Following indiscriminate repression, groups that rely on local support and high
out-group antagonism are incentivized to retaliate and shift their target preference toward
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soft civilian targets in the out-group. In contrast, groups with local support and low out-
group antagonism are less responsive to repression and choose to keep restraint in their
targeting profile in order to differentiate themselves from the oppressive government and
win broader support. Empirical evidence from the cross-national analysis of new data on
terrorist organizations (1995-2007) and micro-level data on repression and targeting from
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (1987-2004) supports the theoretical argument.
This article makes three main contributions. First, it provides a novel approach to the
study of terrorist violence which incorporates the endogenous choice among terrorist targets,
through the concept of relative preference for soft civilian vs. official and low-casualty tar-
gets. Focusing on variation in the quality (target types) of terrorist violence complements
existing studies on the quantity of terrorism, and provides new insights into the strategies of
terrorist groups. Second, analyzing variation in the political costs of civilian targeting across
organizations provides an alternative explanation for why groups resort to this type of vio-
lence and the extent to which they do so. Attacks on undefended civilians do not necessarily
harm local support but can be an optimal strategy even when groups have strong ties with
a local constituency. This adds important nuance also to existing theories of violence (e.g.
Weinstein, 2007). Moreover, contrary to the common view that religious groups are particu-
larly indiscriminate, this article shows that even these groups pursue greater restraint when
they expect high political costs. Finally, while terrorist strategies are often regarded as fixed
in existing studies (e.g. Stanton, 2013; Polo & Gleditsch, 2016) I examine target choice as
a dynamic process, and show how government actions can change the targeting strategies of
specific groups.5 To my knowledge, this study is the first to demonstrate that indiscriminate
government repression can induce substitution among terrorist targets thereby changing the
quality of dissident violence.
5See also Carter (2016); Enders & Sandler (2012).
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Relative preferences and the value of targets
Terrorism can be defined as the premeditated use or threat of violence by subnational groups
in order to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience
beyond the immediate victims (Enders & Sandler, 2012). Terrorism, therefore, has an inher-
ent communicative purpose. The effective communication of a political message, however,
becomes very difficult in the absence of any connection between targets and purpose. The
choice of a specific category of targets often constitutes a form of “signaling” of terrorists’
goals and intentions to the wider audience at which the act is directed, i.e. the state as
well as terrorists’ constituency. (Drake, 1998; Kydd & Walter, 2006; Hoffman, 2006). Thus,
different types of targets carry a different “valence” for both terrorists and their audience.
Attacks against governmental targets6 and infrastructures demonstrate that terrorists have
the capability and resolve to impose costs on the government but choose to overall minimize
the chances of hurting or killing innocent civilians (Conrad & Greene, 2015). Terrorism is
often designed to disrupt and discredit the government by weakening it administratively, im-
pairing normal operations, and demoralizing government officials (Crenshaw, 1981: 386-387).
Terrorist groups can achieve this by attacking targets with a symbolic association with the
government, including civilians with a public role, government facilities, and police forces.
Furthermore, terrorists often compete with the government for popular support, hence they
must convince government’s defenders that continued backing of the government will be
costly, for instance by targeting visible government agents and supporters such as mayors,
police, prosecutors, and pro-regime citizens. (Kydd & Walter, 2006: 66). The Taliban, for
example, have attacked police recruits to discourage cooperation with the Afghan govern-
ment. Similarly, the PKK frequently attacked symbols of the Turkish state to undermine its
6On the importance of including hard/official targets in the definition of terrorism, see
Brandt & Sandler (2010); Santifort, Sandler & Brandt (2013).
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authority. Damaging critical utilities such as power lines and oil pipelines, as well as trans-
portation infrastructures, is also highly disruptive for the government while avoiding possible
backlash effects associated with the targeting of innocent civilians. Moreover, governmental
targets, police, and key infrastructures are often perceived as more “legitimate” targets as
well as contribute to convey an image of militant groups being somehow discriminate in their
use of violence.
Attacks against soft civilian targets are attacks targeted at civilians without a direct
association with the government, including private citizens, civilian businesses such as shops
and restaurants, and other soft targets such as NGOs etc.7 Like attacks on hard/official
targets, these attacks also carry strategic benefits. They are easier to conduct because targets
are often unprotected, they are highly newsworthy, they can spread considerable fear and
erode support for the government, who appears incapable of protecting its citizens (Stanton,
2013). Yet, such a strategy can also yield counterproductive effects since the targeting of
undefended populations generally presents its perpetrators as indiscriminate, uncontrolled,
and lacking any moral restraint (Abrahms, 2013). Moreover, groups risk losing the support
of those populations which they target, who may turn towards the government, and the
legitimacy of their cause may also be undermined (Kalyvas, 2004).
While terrorist organizations often employ both types of attacks (i.e. attack both hard/official
as well as soft civilian targets), they generally display a relative preference for one category
of targets. In other words, the choice of targets is not interchangeable but appears to reflect
a precise strategy. Figure 1 illustrates variation in the percentage of terrorist attacks against
soft civilian vs. hard/official targets for a sample of organizations. Some direct the vast ma-
7It is important to note that not all violence against civilians constitutes terrorism. Par-
ticularly during civil wars, actors often engage in civilian abuses and victimization for the
purpose of extracting resources or cleansing an area, without the intention to coerce the
government and intimidate a larger audience. These forms of violence are beyond the scope
of this study.
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Figure 1. Percentage of attacks against soft civilian vs. hard/official targets for a sample of
organizations (1995-2007)
jority of their attacks against soft civilian targets whereas others focus primarily on official
and harder targets. For instance, over 80% of all attacks perpetrated by the Guatemalan
National Revolutionary Unit and the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist between 1995 and
2007 were against hard/official targets (less than 20% against soft targets). In contrast, over
two-thirds of the attacks carried out by Hamas, the Armed Islamic Group (Algeria), and
UNITA (Angola) targeted undefended civilians.8
To date, however, it remains unclear what determines these strategies, and why soft targets
dominate the portfolio of some groups while hard/official are the preferred strategy of others.
Studies of terrorism often conflate all terrorist targets into a single outcome. This, however,
neglects variation in the character of terrorist violence, and in the different motivations and
incentives which lead groups to attack specific targets. Moreover, looking only at whether
a group ever targets civilians provides little information on whether that group primarily
attacks civilians or whether it is simply very violent but overall favors alternative targeting
strategies. Extant research has generally focused on terrorist targeting strategies in isolation
8A description of the full dataset appears in the research design section.
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and on civilian targeting in an absolute sense (e.g. Abrahms & Potter, 2015; Asal et al.,
2009; Salehyan, Siroky & Wood, 2014). This disregards other targets which are attacked,
many of them reflecting a more discriminate use of violence and an attempt to reduce the
costs for innocent civilians. More generally, if changes in the strategic environment alter
the attractiveness of one category of targets over another, then analyzing target choices in
isolation misses important substitutabilities or complementarities between them and may
lead to incorrect intuitions about their causes (Bueno de Mesquita, 2013).
A notable exception is Polo and Gleditsch’s (2016) study on the effect of ideology on target
selection in civil wars. However, ideologies often reflect specific normative commitments
rather than a strategic calculus (Sanin & Wood, 2014) and since they are normally fixed they
can hardly explain changes in target selection. Terrorist groups generally have two strategic
purposes: to gain supporters and to coerce the government (Pape, 2003). The argument I
present in this article links terrorist target selection with these strategic objectives. It also
differs from Polo and Gleditsch in a number of ways, including linking targeting strategies to
groups’ specific sources of support and ties to local populations, examining how government
behavior can change groups’ target preference, and analyzing a wider set of groups involved
in terrorism, not limited to civil wars.
Although both hard/official and soft civilian targets allow a group to intimidate and inflict
damage on the government, these two categories of targets differ significantly in their political
costs, especially the risk of causing a popular backlash against the group. When groups care
about gaining supporters they may face a dilemma because the targets which are easier to
attack are likely to generate the highest political costs in terms of support. At the same
time–as I argue in the next section–these political costs are not felt in the same way by
all groups and at all times. Variation in groups’ susceptibility to political costs, and in the
expected responses of local constituencies, are a key determinant of terrorist target selection.
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Sources of support, out-group antagonism, and the asym-
metric costs and benefits of targeting strategies
Terrorist groups not only seek to coerce opponents but also to mobilize support for the cause.
However, inflicting harm on members of the target audience often comes at the risk of losing
sympathy for the group’s cause (Pape, 2003; Fortna, 2015). How do terrorist groups reconcile
these strategic objectives? I argue that target selection provides an answer. Groups choose
their target portfolio carefully in order to generate and maintain support for their cause while
simultaneously imposing costs on the government. How groups accomplish this, hence their
optimal targeting strategy, depends on specific characteristics of the organizations and on
the behavior of the government. In this section I focus on the former. I present a typology
of organizations based on the intersection of two factors: the location of an organization’s
main sources of support (local civilians vs. external) and the degree of out-group antagonism
between the organization’s actual or perceived local constituency and all other members of
the population (low vs. high). From this typology I derive expectations on the extent to
which an organization targets undefended civilians or hard/official and low-casualty targets,
hence its relative target preference. In the next section I will introduce the role of government
repression and how this accounts for changes in target preference.
Popular support often plays a crucial role in determining the political success of dissident
groups, including those who resort to terrorist tactics. Popular support is important not only
when these groups fight a civil war, where recruitment and material support are central, but
also outside full-scale civil wars. In the latter context, the level of violence is generally much
lower and attempts to influence policy by extreme violent means are likely to be met with
antagonism from the population (Abrahms, 2013). Since the coercive power of armed groups
is relatively low and the risk of backlash high, such groups need to ensure that terrorism
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imposes costs on the government without hurting popular support for their cause.
A common argument for the counterproductive nature of terrorist violence against civilians
is that this strategy severely undermines popular support and incentivizes the civilians tar-
geted to side with the opponent (Kalyvas 2004, 2006). However, organizations differ widely
in the extent to which they try to elicit popular support and establish social ties with the
local population (Weinstein, 2007). Organizations who mainly rely on local civilian support,
as opposed to external sources of support such as foreign patrons, foreign terrorist organi-
zations, or foreign fighters, incur large costs for targeting civilians as their primary terrorist
strategy. By attacking undefended civilians they will risk alienating actual or potential sup-
porters as well as exposing their own constituency to direct government retaliation, which
would not occur when support comes mainly from outside the country. Individual targets are
then likely to be chosen based on their potential to generate publicity and put pressure on
the government without depriving groups of their needed local support. In contrast, when
an organization mainly relies on external sources of support its demand for local civilian
support is considerably reduced. Foreign support essentially operates as a valuable outside
option which allows the group to substitute local civilians with others, and to exploit ter-
rorist attacks against soft targets to galvanize international audiences and to easily inflict
damage on enemies without suffering the domestic political costs of doing so.
A comparison of organizations in the ongoing Syrian conflict can be illustrative in this
regard. As mentioned in the introduction, the Islamic State has been responsible for the
vast majority of terrorist attacks against soft civilian targets. Unlike the locals Free Syrian
Army, Ansar al-Sham and Ahrar al-Sham, IS is a transnational organization, with bases and
sources of support in multiple countries, which tends to address a global rather than a local
audience;9 in fact it has attracted the largest number of foreign fighters, coming from many
9See also Toft & Zhukov (2015).
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different countries including France, Belgium, Germany, the United Kingdom, Tunisia, and
Saudi Arabia. This has reduced its need for local civilian support. Interestingly, an exclusive
focus on the organization’s religious ideology (Polo & Gleditsch, 2016) cannot explain the
observed differences in behavior with the local Islamist groups involved in the conflict.
However, sources of support alone are insufficient to fully explain targeting strategies. In
particular, as noted in the introduction, not all groups with local support have incentives to
refrain from targeting civilians. The nature of a group’s relationship with its constituency,
and especially the existence of a strong boundary between an in-group and an out-group,
can lead to significant differences in targeting strategies among groups with local support.
The assumption that civilians, in conflicts, are simply guided by a logic of survival, which
trumps any other ethnic or ideological allegiance, is not always warranted. Civilian wartime
attitudes, which are vital to explaining popular support, are often conditional on the identity
of combatants (Lyall, Blair & Imai, 2013). Not all perpetrators are punished for attacking
civilians, some have much more leeway than others in their choice of violent strategies because
their constituencies are more likely to countenance violence against civilians, and because
attacks against enemy constituents are rewarded with increased popular support. This point
constitutes a significant departure from existing arguments on the limiting effect of local
support on civilian targeting (Salehyan, Siroky & Wood, 2014; Weinstein, 2007).
Out-group antagonism refers to a tendency to divide people into a favored in-group and
disfavored out-groups. The existence of a strong divide, based for instance on ethnicity or
religion, between terrorists’ constituency and all the “others” can be a powerful source of
high out-group antagonism (Lyall, Blair & Imai, 2013; Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008). This
introduces different categories of civilians: some that belong to the militants’ side and others
that are regarded as enemy civilians. This determines an us versus them situation which
legitimizes the targeting of what Goodwin calls ‘complicitous civilians’, those civilians who
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are seen as benefiting, supporting, and having the capacity to influence the choices of the
state against which terrorists are fighting (Goodwin, 2006: 2037). If the civilians targeted
belong to a different group than the one terrorists claim to represent, targeting civilians
does not necessarily undermine terrorists’ support base, with a consequent impact on the
group’s cost-benefit calculations. Instead, if members of the general population are seen as
potential supporters or converts to terrorists’ cause, without significant distinctions based
on ascriptive identities, then the group will have incentives to be more selective in its choice
of targets to avoid alienating potential supporters (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008).
The relevance of group identities and out-group antagonism becomes apparent in the
comparison between organizations with sectarian goals (ethnonationalist and religious) and
organizations with more universalist political goals (Hoffman, 2006; Stanton, 2013). Religion
and ethnicity represent ‘two of the most basic forms of identification available to individuals’
(Lutz & Lutz, 2008: 129). Ethnic identity is very difficult to change, and sharing the same
citizenship has not prevented ethnic groups from perceiving themselves as radically different,
even as enemies. Religion is also a powerful cultural identifier. Most people do not change
their religion, and even when they are not active followers they may still perceive religion
as part of their own cultural identity. In contrast, political affiliation – whether based on
left-wing, right-wing or specific policy preferences – involves a much more conscious choice
on the part of individuals to share a given set of political beliefs and ideals which can even-
tually be changed without necessarily affecting other aspects of someone’s life (Lutz & Lutz,
2008). Unlike many ethnic organizations, who can count on a natural and relatively cohesive
constituency among members of the ethnic group, from which they can draw resources and
support, both leftist and rightist organizations (and similar policy-oriented groups) ‘must
actively proselytize among the politically aware and/or the radicals, though often uncom-
mitted, for recruits and support’ (Hoffman, 2006: 243). As a consequence, to create and
maintain support for their cause these groups need to minimize the risk of targeting po-
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tential supporters and tailor their violent actions so as to raise costs for the government
while remaining acceptable, and appeal, to their broad constituency. Thus, in the absence
of external sources of support, these groups derive greater benefits from attacking primarily
hard/official targets.
The combination between location of support and degree of out-group antagonism deter-
mines organizational incentives for targeting strategies. Table I illustrates these combina-
tions.
Table I. Out-group antagonism, ties with local population-constituency, and targeting strate-
gies
Reliance on local civilian
support
Strong ties with
constituency
No reliance on local civilian
support
Weak/absent ties with
constituency
Low out-group antagonism High prop. hard/official targets High prop. soft targets
[NPA, Philipppines] [UNITA, Angola]
High out-group antagonism Medium prop. soft targets High prop. soft targets
[Fatah/Al-Aqsa, Palestine] [IS, Syria]
Organizations that largely rely on external sources of support and have very weak ties
with a local constituency face little constraints in targeting civilians, and are expected to
invest their resources in attacking primarily soft civilian targets. High out-group antagonism
may lead to more attacks against civilians, but this effect is conditional on local civilian
support. The reason for this asymmetry is that groups who rely primarily on external
support in general have little incentive to connect with local constituents. The absence of
a clear boundary between in-group and out-group is not a deterrent; rather, it makes the
population at large a possible target since their support is no longer vital and the group may
even use civilian targeting to provoke a government overreaction, or turn the population
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against an incapable government without undermining its own survival.
Conversely, if external support is not available, the absence of a clear in-group/out-group
(low out-group antagonism) implies that the organization must appeal to the civilian popu-
lation at large, and bargain with them for support, in order to be viable. Hence, targeting
those civilians can be extremely counterproductive. Instead, attacks on hard/official targets
allow organizations to achieve an optimal balance between imposing costs on the government
and maintaining support for the cause.
On the other hand, organizations with high out-group antagonism and strong ties with
a local constituency, from which they recruit members, face competing incentives. While
out-group antagonism creates incentives for targeting out-group civilians, thereby reducing
political costs, the local nature of the organization’s support-base allows the government to
easily retaliate against the group’s constituency. If the population begins to withdraw its
support or is no longer able to provide sufficient resources and recruits as a consequence of
being targeted, the organization will be weakened because it cannot replace those civilians
with others (see also Byman, 1998). As I will discuss in the next section, the specific behavior
of the government is crucial to determine which of these opposing incentives ultimately
prevails.
Based on Table I , I now proceed to delineate the first set of hypotheses on the relationship
between group characteristics and relative target preferences.
H1: Groups with external sources of support are more likely to attack primarily soft civilian
targets than groups that rely on local support.
H2: Groups that rely on local support and have low out-group antagonism are less likely
to attack soft civilian targets and more likely attack primarily hard/official targets.
H3: Groups that rely on local support and have high out-group antagonism are more likely
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to attack soft civilian targets than groups with low out-group antagonism but less likely than
groups with external sources of support (i.e. intermediate proportion of attacks against soft
targets).
The dynamic context of target choice: Targeting civilians as a re-
sponse to indiscriminate government repression
So far I have discussed the role of group characteristics, and I have argued that the nature
and strength of ties between terrorist groups and their perceived constituency shape groups’
relative target preferences for hard/official or soft civilian targets. Groups, however, do not
exist in a vacuum. In what follows I argue that indiscriminate government repression also
influences targeting strategies by mitigating groups’ organizational constraints for targeting
civilians. The effect of repression is most consequential when organizations face competing
incentives due to their reliance on local support and high out-group antagonism. In fact, when
the government uses indiscriminate repression, these organizations can gain a significant
popularity boost by retaliating against undefended civilians in the out-group. Hence, they
are more likely to respond to repression by shifting their relative preference toward soft
civilian targets.
Indiscriminate government repression targets whole categories of individuals based not
on their individual behavior but rather on their ethnicity, religion, or location (Kalyvas,
2006). This includes categorical violence as well as repression of the general population. In
the presence of out-group antagonism, repression strengthens the targeted group identity
and hardens the boundary between in-group and out group, to the point where crossing
this, and supporting the government, becomes impossible (Cederman, Gleditsch & Buhaug,
2013; Tilly, 2003). Indiscriminate repression can radicalize the population, including those
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previously uncommitted, and generate a form of reactive mobilization which undermines the
moderates (Schutte, 2017; Kalyvas, 2004; Wood, 2003). Within the targeted group it can
make individuals more resilient and accepting of attacks against civilians in the out-group
as a legitimate response. Therefore, for groups with high out-group antagonism and who
rely on local support repression reduces the political costs of targeting civilians. Such groups
are more likely to shift their targeting strategies towards soft civilian targets – so that these
become the preferred choice – when facing a highly repressive government; however, they
are more restrained, and primarily attack hard/official targets, against a peaceful or less
repressive government. For these groups, indiscriminate repression radically changes the
quality of terrorist violence.
In contrast, organizations with low out-group antagonism are less responsive to repression
and derive greater benefits from maintaining a strategy of restraint. These organizations do
not have a clearly defined in-group and out-group based on relatively visible characteristics
(i.e. ethnicity or religion). The absence of strong identity bonds makes it more difficult for
these organizations to recruit and retain members and supporters. Moreover, their potential
constituency among the population is likely to at least partially overlap with the government’s
potential constituency, which makes these organizations more likely to compete with the
government for popular sympathy and support. If the government is repressive against the
population at large they will be better off by differentiating themselves and refraining from
attacking unarmed civilians as their primary strategy.
H4: Given a reliance on local support and high out-group antagonism, indiscriminate
government repression shift groups’ relative target preference toward soft civilian targets.
16
Data and research design
The theory above emphasizes the role of actor profiles. Hence, to test the hypotheses I have
constructed a dataset of terrorist organizations which includes 130 organizations from 1995 to
2007. The dataset encompasses both groups active during civil conflicts, even if they engage
in lower intensity violence, and groups not engaged in civil war, together with information on
the characteristics of each group.10 To construct the dataset I have first linked organizations
in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD, 2013) – the major source of information on terrorist
events worldwide – with non-state actors in the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch
et al., 2002) and the Big Allied And Dangerous dataset (BAAD) by Asal and Rethemeyer
(2008).11
Target types from the GTD have been divided into hard/official and low-casualty targets
vs. soft civilian targets. The former includes governmental targets, police, and infrastruc-
tures. Soft civilian targets include private citizens, civilian businesses, religious figures, civil
society actors, and similar.12 The logic of this classification reflects the degree to which spe-
cific attacks are likely to harm innocent civilians and therefore generate a popular backlash
against the group. The typology excludes attacks that could be regarded as more con-
ventional guerrilla warfare.13 I have also excluded transnational attacks which take place
outside a group’s home state or main bases of operation because these attacks are less likely
to generate a domestic backlash, even if they target civilians. The dependent variable is op-
erationalized as the proportion of attacks against soft civilian targets.14 The unit of analysis
10Due to space constraints summary statistics are reported in the appendix.
11Due to partial name differences the matching was done on a case by case basis. The
limited temporal coverage of the dataset is due to BAAD, which only includes groups from
1998 to 2005, and to the limited availability of information on groups’ sources of support.
12A full list is included in the supplemental appendix.
13Although I present results with and without military targets.
14The denominator is the sum of official/low-casualty and soft.
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is the organization-year.
To code out-group antagonism I examine whether an organization claims to represent a
specific ethnic or religious group as in the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (EPR, Cederman,
Min & Wimmer, 2010), or makes religious claims. This variable is coded from four different
sources.15 It takes the form of a dummy, coded one for groups with ethnic/religious claims,
zero otherwise. Data on external/local support are gathered from a number of sources. The
UCDP external support dataset provides information on whether armed groups receive ex-
ternal support from either state or non-state actors in a given year (Ho¨gbladh, Pettersson
& Themne´r, 2011). I have coded this information also for non-UCDP organizations using
the same criteria from several primary and secondary sources.16 The absence of external
support reasonably implies that the organization is more likely to rely on local support to
sustain itself, and has stronger incentives to connect with a local constituency than organi-
zations with external support which have outside options. Nonetheless, whenever possible,
I have explicitly coded the extent of local support. Specifically, for those organizations with
ethnoreligious linkages, I have gathered information on whether these recruit from the eth-
nic/religious group and whether they receive support from the group’s population.17 Among
these organizations I could distinguish between those with large-scale local support (re-
cruitment and support), those with some local support (recruitment only and no external
support), and those with primarily external support (external support and no local sup-
port).18 Based on this information I have generated a dummy variable coded one for groups
15The ACD2EPR (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012) and the GTD2EPR (Polo, 2015), which
code ethnic linkages of actors in the UCDP ACD and the GTD; Polo & Gleditsch (2016))
and BAAD for coding armed groups’ religious claims and linkages.
16These include the Mapping Militant Organizations Project (Stanford University), the
US Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism, Lexis-Nexis, and case-studies.
17The coding was based on the ACD2EPR and the GTD2EPR.
18For other organizations, in the absence of any evidence of external support I had to
assume that these were more likely to rely on some form of local support to sustain their
activities. Indeed, for some of these groups I was able to find specific evidence for ties with
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that mainly rely on external support and have weak ties with a local constituency.19
To test the effect of government repression across groups I use the Political Terror Scale
(Gibney et al., 2012). I calculate the average of the US State Department and Amnesty scores
for each country and generate a categorical variable ranging from 1 to 5, where higher values
indicate an increase in the scope, intensity and range of violence. Specifically, increasing
values reflect the extent to which the government targets civilians who have not been actively
involved in dissent, hence indiscriminate repression.
Among the control variables I include, firstly, the membership size of the organization
since military weakness may be an alternative reason for attacking civilians as a primary
strategy. For non-UCDP groups I relied on a categorical variable from the BAAD dataset,
whereas for groups in civil war I have used annual estimates of troop size from the UCDP
Encyclopedia and Wood (Wood, 2010), and then aggregated these to generate a categorical
variable ranging from 0 to 3 that matches the one from BAAD.20 I also consider whether a
group controls territory (Kalyvas, 2006), based on BAAD and the Non-State Actor dataset
(Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2009) and the age of the organization which may
influence target substitution over time. Finally, I control for ongoing civil war, the number
of terrorist attacks by the group, intergroup competition (i.e. the number of attacks against
other militant groups) and temporal dependence (i.e. lagged dependent variable).
To test the hypotheses I use a fractional response model, specifically a fractional logit
a local constituency (in the absence of external support), which contributes to validating
the coding decision. Unfortunately, coding the extent of local support for all organizations
in the dataset is not feasible, due to the lack of data and the clandestine nature of many
organizations.
19There are very few cases of organizations with strong local support which at times
received external support. Given the strong connection with a local constituency I coded
these has relying primarily on local support, although an alternative coding does not alter
the main results.
20Specifically, 0 (up to 100 members), 1 (100-1,000), 2 (1,000-10,000), 3 (> 10,000).
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(Papke & Wooldridge, 1996). This estimation strategy allows modeling a fractional response
variable such as a proportion bounded between zero and one. The model uses a binomial
distribution for the dependent variable with a logit link function.
While a cross-national analysis captures differences in behavior depending on organiza-
tional factors (H1-H3), it does not allow to fully examine changes in terrorist targeting
strategies following increases in government indiscriminate repression (H4). This because
the available cross-national data on government repression mainly captures the general level
of repression but not the specific nature of government actions, its targets, and changes
over time. To address this limitation I use micro-level data on government and terrorist
actions from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict between 1987 and 2004. This allows testing
how specific government actions, more or less repressive towards terrorist groups and their
constituency, influence the targeting of out-group civilians. The focus on Palestinian organi-
zations’ response to Israeli repressive actions is especially appropriate since it tests the effect
of indiscriminate repression where this matters most, namely, among groups characterized by
high out-group antagonism and generally strong ties with a local constituency; these groups
should be the most likely to engage in target substitution following repression.21 I use the
GATE-Israel dataset by Dugan & Chenoweth (2012) which provides monthly counts of Israeli
repressive actions towards the Palestinians and specifies whether they are discriminate or in-
discriminate. I combine this with Palestinian terrorist attacks from the GTD, disaggregated
by actors and target types. The latter only include Israeli targets. I estimate a fractional
logit on the monthly proportion of attacks against soft civilian targets. I control for the
lagged proportion of soft targets to account for temporal dependence, Israeli conciliatory
actions, the strength of groups’ local support, and time fixed effects.
21The strong ties between most Palestinian organizations and the Palestinian population
are well documented, see e.g. Wucherpfennig et al. (2012); Huang (2016). However, in the
robustness checks I distinguish between groups with strong and weak local support.
20
Empirical analysis and discussion
The results from a fractional logit on the proportion of attacks against soft civilian targets
are shown in Table II, with Model 1 presenting the main specification, while Models 2
and 3 include additional control variables and attacks on military targets (as part of the
hard/official category).22
Consistent with the expectations, organizations that mainly rely on external sources of
support are more likely to attack soft civilian targets. Groups characterized by high out-group
antagonism also have a higher proportion of attacks against soft targets than groups with low
out-group antagonism although–as expected–the coefficient is smaller than that of external
support. These results illustrate important differences in the extent to which groups target
civilians based on their sources of support and degree of out-group antagonism. However,
to evaluate and compare the expected proportion of soft civilian targets across groups it is
necessary to examine the substantive effects, which I will discuss later. The results hold
also when controlling for possible alternative explanations of civilian targeting such as group
strength, territorial control, civil war involvement, overall violence, group competition, and
when including military targets.
The coefficient for government repression is positive and significant, which suggests that
repression generally has a positive effect on the proportion of soft civilian targets. Recall,
however, that the effect of repression is expected to vary across groups and that high levels
of repression should change the relative preference of groups with high out-group antagonism
and local support in favor of civilian targets, but not the targeting strategies of other groups.
To evaluate this hypothesis and the substantive implications of the models with respect to
target preferences I turn to the substantive effects, based on estimates from Model 1.
22All models are estimated in Stata 15. Graphs are generated in R (version 3.5.1) with
package ggplot2.
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Table II. Proportion of attacks against soft civilian targets (fractional logit, GLM)
Main Additional controls Including military targets
External support 1.191∗∗∗ 1.160∗∗∗ 1.178∗∗∗
(0.190) (0.189) (0.187)
Out-group antagonism 0.619∗∗∗ 0.794∗∗∗ 0.691∗∗
(0.171) (0.223) (0.225)
Repression 0.208∗∗ 0.165† 0.206∗
(0.078) (0.092) (0.089)
Group size −0.093 −0.052 −0.049
(0.102) (0.110) (0.111)
Group age 0.007† 0.008∗ 0.008†
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Territorial control 0.080 0.090 0.054
(0.173) (0.170) (0.172)
Soft targets lag 0.603
∗∗ 0.578∗∗ 0.605∗∗
(0.218) (0.219) (0.213)
Civil war −0.067 −0.093
(0.205) (0.215)
Total number of attacks 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
Group competition (infighting) −0.296∗∗ −0.335∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.085)
Secessionist group −0.266 −0.261
(0.190) (0.188)
Constant −1.758∗∗∗ −1.645∗∗∗ −1.800∗∗∗
(0.348) (0.352) (0.358)
Wald χ2 84.40∗∗∗ 90.75∗∗∗ 99.48∗∗∗
Log-Likelihood −323.93 −321.94 −321.39
Number of observations 600 600 601
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on the organization
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Figure 2 shows the predicted proportion of soft civilian targets for specific group profiles,
namely, groups with primarily external support, groups with local support and high out-
group antagonism, and groups with local support and low out-group antagonism. All other
variables are held at their observed values. A predicted proportion above the fifty percent
threshold indicates a relative preference for soft civilian targets (i.e. the majority of attacks
are against soft civilian targets). Groups with external sources of support, regardless of out-
group antagonism, are systematically more likely to focus primarily on soft civilian targets as
their predicted proportion is above seventy percent. For these groups targeting undefended
civilians is a cost-effective strategy given the generally weak ties with local constituencies.
Groups with low out-group antagonism and local support (no external support) are less likely
to attack civilians and more likely to focus on government and low-casualty targets, which
confirms these groups as the most restrained (predicted proportion around thirty percent).
Groups with high out-group antagonism and local support do not meet the fifty percent
threshold, but are generally more likely to target civilians than groups with low antagonism
and local support.
Figure 3 illustrates the effect of government repression on groups’ incentives to attack soft
civilian targets. Since groups with external support always have a relative preference for such
targets, Figure 3 compares groups with local support and low/high out-group antagonism.
The results are shown specifically for relatively weak groups (estimated size between 100 and
1000 members) because a common argument holds that violence against civilians is generally
employed by weak groups, hence this scenario constitutes a hard test for the theory. The
graphs show that organizations with low out-group antagonism remain less likely to target
primarily soft civilian targets even when repression is high and they are relatively weak
(proportion below 50%). Instead, groups with high out-group antagonism shift their relative
preference toward civilian targets when facing a highly repressive government, but are more
restrained at lower levels of repression.
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Figure 2. Predicted proportion of attacks against soft civilian targets based on sources
of support and degree of out-group antagonism. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Numbers above bars indicate number of observations in each category.
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Figure 3. Effect of repression on target selection for groups with local support and varying
levels of out-group antagonism (low vs. high). Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Case study: Palestinian responses to Israeli repression (1987-2004)
The cross-country analysis has provided initial support for the role of government repression
in shaping the target preference of organizations with high out-group antagonism and local
support. However, the cross-national repression data mainly captures aggregate differences
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between states. It does not allow to examine specific government actions and targets, and
whether groups with high antagonism and local support change their target preference when
the government becomes more indiscriminate against them. To better explore this substitu-
tion effect, and the dynamic nature of target choice, I turn to micro-level evidence from the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Figure 4 illustrates the number of quarterly repressive actions by
the Israeli government against the Palestinians together with the number of Palestinian at-
tacks against soft civilian and official/hard targets as well as Israeli non-repressive actions.23
Sharp increases in Israeli repressive actions (relative to non-repressive/conciliatory actions)
are associated with spikes of terrorist attacks against soft civilian targets but do not appear
systematically associated with attacks against official/hard targets.
To examine whether groups substitute targets following increases in indiscriminate re-
pression I analyze groups’ relative target preferences. I estimate a fractional logit on the
monthly percentage of Palestinian attacks against soft civilian targets as a function of Israeli
indiscriminately repressive actions in the previous month24, controlling for previous attacks
against civilians, Israeli conciliatory actions, strength of groups’ local support, and time fixed
effects.25 Figure 5 illustrates how the predicted proportion of Palestinian terrorist attacks
against soft civilian targets increases from less than 50 to over 75% as Israeli indiscriminate
repression in the previous month increases from the fifth to the ninety-fifth percentile, hold-
ing all other variables at their observed values. This result further demonstrates how terrorist
organizations with high out-group antagonism and primarily local support respond to repres-
sion by shifting their target preference toward undefended civilians in the out-group. These
organizations face some political costs for attacking civilians but indiscriminate repression
23Target types classified as in the main analysis: official/hard vs. soft. Data aggregated
by quarters for visual purposes. Note that attacks are missing from the GTD in 1993 (GTD
codebook).
24All variables are temporally lagged to alleviate endogeneity issues.
25Due to space considerations the full model is reported in the supplemental appendix.
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Figure 4. Quarterly repressive and conciliatory actions by Israel and Palestinian organiza-
tions’ targeting strategies.
significantly mitigates such costs. It exacerbates out-group antagonism among those targeted
and pushes organizations toward retaliation against the enemy’s constituency. Government
indiscriminately repressive measures, even when they do not generate a full backlash effect,
can change the quality of terrorist violence by shifting (some) groups’ relative preference
towards soft civilian targets.
Alternative explanations and robustness
An alternative explanation for different targeting strategies focuses on principal-agent prob-
lems whereby organizations with a weak leadership and little control over the rank and file
become more likely to target primarily undefended civilians. It is certainly plausible that
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Figure 5. Predicted proportion of Palestinian attacks against soft targets at varying levels of
Israeli indiscriminate repression in the previous month. Grey areas indicate 95% confidence
intervals. Rug plot shows distribution of repression values.
some attacks against civilians could result from the inability of an organization’s leadership
to enforce a more discriminate strategy, thus leaving foot-soldiers free to terrorize civilian
populations. However, a consistent preference for this strategy is less likely to be a byprod-
uct of leadership failures. Moreover, such an explanation would not be consistent with the
findings in this article because it would imply that the default strategy for all organizations
with strong leadership is to refrain from attacking civilians. Instead, this study has shown
that organizations have different relative target preferences depending on sources of support,
out-group antagonism, and government behavior: unless one assumes that organizations with
low antagonism and local support are the only ones with strong leaders, because they are
the least likely to target civilians, it would be difficult to explain the findings only based on
27
this alternative mechanism.26
The empirical results are also robust to several alternative specifications and estimations.
These tests and the results are discussed in detail in the supplemental appendix. To summa-
rize, I have checked the results’ robustness to alternative classifications of specific targets as
hard or soft, the inclusion of transnational attacks, different measures of direct and indirect
civil war involvement as well as civil war battlefield violence, group competition, country
fixed effects, regional dummies, OLS estimations, and interactions between local support
and out-group antagonism. In addition, I have extended the microlevel analysis to account
for the ethnic identity of terrorist targets (out-group vs. in-group) and for differences in the
strength of Palestinian groups’ local support. All results are consistent with the theory.
Finally, some may wonder whether target choice is actually a cause of government indis-
criminate repression, hence endogenous. In this regard, the relationship between repression
and target choice is rather nuanced since some groups change their relative preference towards
soft civilian targets in response to government repression while others do not. Moreover, in
the microlevel analysis leading values of repression are not significant for explaining the pro-
portion of soft civilian targets, which implies that changes in target preference indeed follow
indiscriminate repression. I also re-estimated the models in the case-study with two placebo
dependent variables capturing, respectively, attacks by non-Palestinian groups in Israel and
attacks by Palestinians against their in-group. In line with the expectations, these targeting
strategies are not responsive to Israeli repression.
26Although given a group’s relative preference, agency losses could make things worse.
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Conclusion
This article has investigated the logic of terrorist target choice. It has proposed a novel
approach to understanding target choice which allows for a direct comparison of the extent
to which groups attack specific targets and whether they have a relative preference for soft
civilian targets as opposed to more discriminate targeting strategies. Unlike previous studies
which focused on the number of terrorist attacks, terrorist fatalities, or binary indicators of
terrorism, this article has demonstrated that while most terrorist organizations do attack
civilians they often have a relative preference for either official and relatively harder targets
or for soft civilian targets, and this translates into different overall targeting strategies. There
is great variation in how armed groups relate to civilians and in how the need for support
shapes groups’ targeting decisions. The highlighted differences based on degree of out-group
antagonism and on the strength of ties between the organization and a local constituency can
explain the extent to which groups target undefended civilians or official targets in terrorist
attacks.
The analytical approach focused on relative target preference has also allowed examining
the extent of terrorist target substitution, and under what conditions groups switch from
a more restrained use of violence to attacking primarily defenseless civilians. The results
suggest that indiscriminate government repression can lead to substitution and change the
quality of terrorist violence for those organizations who can justify attacks on out-group
civilians as a legitimate retaliation and minimize possible counterproductive effects. Other
groups persist in a strategy of restraint even when they are militarily weak and face state
repression. This, in turn, reinforces the idea that the political costs (and benefits) of attacking
soft civilian targets are not uniform across organizations. These results also shed light on
the inconsistent effect of military capabilities on incentives for targeting civilians in previous
studies (see Fortna, 2015). Terrorist attacks against undefended civilians are not necessarily a
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weapon of the weak: in fact, they may be chosen strategically also by relatively strong groups
if political costs are sufficiently low. Moreover, the empirical findings can offer new insights
into the effect of ethnic and religious conflict cleavages on group incentives for targeting
civilians in terrorist attacks. Existing research has often reached opposite conclusions, and
found evidence for both restraint and indiscriminate targeting. This study has shown that
the behavior of the government is crucial to determine which incentive ultimately prevails.
Finally, examining the type of violent responses to repression, rather than just the aggregate
level of dissent, can provide novel insights into the so-called ‘punishment puzzle’ (Davenport,
2007). Depending on their organizational incentives, groups may react to the same level of
repression in very different ways.
While this analysis has helped uncover important group-level differences in targeting
strategies, I acknowledge that the data used are not without limitations. With respect
to ties with local constituencies and degree of reliance on local support, my measures can
only proxy these features but not assess them directly, particularly for organizations that are
not tied to a specific ethnic or religious group. Nonetheless, the data I use—which comple-
ment existing state-of-the-art measures with original data collection efforts—are among the
most comprehensive currently available at cross-national level. The difficulty of gathering
detailed information on specific group characteristics has also necessarily reduced the sample
of groups examined and the temporal coverage of the analysis. The microlevel data on Is-
raeli repressive measures, although among the most highly disaggregated currently available,
only cover a single country for a limited time-period. Future data collection efforts, both
cross-national and microlevel, will allow for a more extensive and fine-grained empirical test
of the theoretical framework presented in this study. These caveats notwithstanding, the
empirical results provide considerable support for the proposed explanation of groups’ tar-
geting strategies, and the different incentives that organizations face with regard to specific
targets. The case-study offers additional microlevel evidence for the proposed interaction
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between organizational factors and government actions in influencing terrorist target selec-
tion and substitution. Future research could expand the focus of this study, for instance
by disaggregating militant groups’ sources of support and exploring different mechanisms
through which state and non-state external support enable or constrain terrorist targeting
strategies. The effect of government behavior on groups’ tactics could also be further exam-
ined, beyond a limited focus on indiscriminate repression, to include selective government
violence and conciliatory actions. Moreover, we still know little about how intergroup com-
petition affects terrorist target selection, particularly groups’ incentives for emulation as well
as differentiation of targeting strategies. This, too, should be the subject of future studies.
Replication data
The datasets and code to replicate the empirical analysis in this article, along with the online
appendix, can be found at http://www.prio.org/jpr/datasets.
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